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PETITION 
Pu rsuant i.<) Ru] e 35, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, appellant (Trimble) respectful 1 v petitions for a 
rehearing. The grounds for f b i ;-i nint 10 are as stated below. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Trimble is a broker, Ohran is i seller. Fitz-
gerald is a m; - • HI ai i oa " dc» i.un, Trimble (Broker) 
sued Fitzgexi Buyer) for real estate commission. 
Trimble lost. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 
P.2d 453 (Utah 1981) . 
Thereafter, Trimble (Broker) sued Ohran (Seller) 
for " real estate commission growing out t h<=> same 
transaction. This second suit was dismissed on the basis of 
collateral estoppel Tlm« the trial court judge ruled that: 
The issue at the first trial and the 
present issue are essentially the same, 
that is, whether a real estate commission 
was due Florence from the sale of Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc. . . .and if so, who 
should pay the commission. (R.252.) 
This court's opinion turned what documents were 
available to the trial court. This court reasoned that: 
From all that appears in the Supreme 
Court opinion, the jury's judgment that 
Fitzgerald did not owe a commission means 
that Trimble was not entitled to a 
commission at all [from either Buyer or 
Seller.] 
Slip Opinion, at p. 5. 
On the other hand, the court conceded that the 
opinion standing alone might be misleading: 
Close examination of the record in a 
proceeding may well lead to a conclusion 
somewhat at odds with the apparent 
"plain meaning" of a reported decision. 
Slip Opinion, at p. 6. 
Thus, this court's opinion turned exclusively on 
whether the trial court should have taken judicial notice of 
certain records from the earlier trial. 
.[T]he trial court did not err in 
failing to review the record of the prior 
proceedings on its own motion. It is not 
mandatory that we take notice of the 
record in that proceeding for the first 
time on appeal. . . 
Slip Opinion, at p. 9. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
It • • ' < aly true thai "Trimble attempted to 
inject documents from the first trial at a fairly late stage 
of the proceedings It is also true t B? -, j •: .nients (if 
received) w * n useful in clarifying the collateral 
estoppel issue. However, Trimble has never contended that 
such documents were indispensable Indeed, Trimble has 
consistently argued that the trial court's ruling was 
incorrect on the basis of the existing record! It is 
respectfully submitted that UILS Court's opinion wholly fails 
to analyze the collateral estoppel issue on the basis of the 
existing record. 
The language at issue was a jury instruction which 
states: 
.The agreement of December 7, 19 7 7 
imposed upon defendant the liability for 
the real estate commission, if any, owed 
plaintiffs upon this transaction. 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453, 455 
(Utah 1981). (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court believed the words if any means 
that no one in the world owed Trimble (Broker) a commission. 
The fallacy is that the trial coui rather to look at 
3 
the caption. This was a lawsuit between Trimble (Broker) and 
Fitzgerald (Buyer). The only thing which could possibly have 
been adjudicated in that earlier trial was whether Fitzgerald 
(Buyer) owed a commission to Trimble (Broker). If we want to 
know whether anyone in the world owes a commission to Trimble 
(Broker)f everyone in the world would have to be added as 
party defendants. The point is so elementary that no 
citation is required. 
It is true that the Ohran (Seller) was involved in 
the prior suit. However, he was involved in a cross-claim 
with Fitzgerald (Buyer). However, that cross-claim had 
nothing to do with Trimble (Broker). Or stated in other 
words, the original lawsuit did not involve any claim by 
Trimble (Broker) against Ohran (Seller) for a real estate 
commission. 
The trial court was fully aware of the nature of 
the original lawsuit. Indeed, the matter was frequently 
argued. Early in the litigation, Ohran (Seller) made a 
motion to dismiss on the basis that Ohran (Seller) was an 
indispensable party in the original action. (R,17, R.20.) 
Actually, that argument was simply a res judicata argument 
under a different name. (R.49, at Point III.) 
4 
In any case (whatever the name), the relationships 
in the earlier case were exp] a i ned to the trial judge in 
great detail- (R.39, R.90.) Indeed, plaintiff's entire 
trial brief from the earlier trial was presented to the trial 
court. ) Thai document describes the relationships in 
graphic form. 
Later, Ohran (Seller) made ,-\ motion for summary 
judgment based upon collateral estoppel, Trimble (Seller) 
made ai1 appropriate response• (R.16 5-166.) Although 
Trimblp s response on collateral estoppel was a bit brief, it 
must be remembered that Trimble (Broker) had earlier in the 
case explained those same relationships to the Court in great 
detail I h i'J M , 'Ml.) 
OiI appeal, this Court concluded that the trial 
court had no duty to take judicial notice of files and 
records from another trial in another county. (Slip Opinion, 
at p. fi and 7. i However, shouldn't the trial court have 
taken judicial notice of its own file? Indeed, shouldn't the 
trial court have taken judicial notice of the caption in Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, supra? 
5 
In the briefing before this Court, Trimble (Broker) 
showed that the relationships from the earlier trial were 
available in the Court's own file—without resort to judicial 
notice, (Appellant's Brief, at p. 15; Appellant's Reply 
Brief, at p. 1-6.) 
DATED this 2~ { day of QTUJLA , 1988. 
ROBERT J. D£BRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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